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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Matthew Joseph Abramowski appeals from the district court’s orders denying his 
motion for “expungement” and denying his motion for reconsideration. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 In 2009, the state filed a criminal complaint charging then 15-year-old 
Abramowski with first degree arson for having “willfully and unlawfully” set fire to his 
parents’ home.1  (R., pp.18-19; see also PSI, pp.1-3.)  The magistrate ordered two 
separate I.C. § 18-211 mental health evaluations for the purpose of determining 
Abramowski’s competency to stand trial.  (R., pp.29, 40-41.)  A third mental health 
clinician also evaluated Abramowski and “provided a report.”  (R., p.58.)  The mental 
health evaluators all apparently agreed Abramowski had a number of age-related and 
“clinical limitations,” including a diagnosis of “Autistic Disorder, High Functioning,” but 
they disagreed about Abramowski’s competency to understand the legal proceedings and 
assist in his own defense.  (R., pp.57-58, 60-62; see also Supp. R., pp.2-3 (report of 
mental evaluation conducted by Dr. Craig W. Beaver on 5/19/10, summarizing findings 
and opinions of mental health clinicians who reported on Abramowski’s competency in 
2009).)  Following a hearing, the magistrate found Abramowski was competent to stand 
trial.  (R., pp.55-64.) 
                                            
1 The complaint indicated Abramowski had been waived into adult court pursuant to the 
automatic waiver provisions of I.C. §§ 20-508, -509.  (See R., p.18.) 
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The case proceeded to a preliminary hearing, after which Abramowski was bound 
over to the district court.  (R., pp.67-75.)  Abramowski ultimately pled guilty to the first 
degree arson charge, and the district court withheld judgment and placed him on 
probation for a period of 10 years.  (R., pp.112-21; Sealed R., pp.203-09, 223-28.)  The 
order of probation provided that Abramowski would initially be supervised by juvenile 
probation authorities but that supervision would be transferred to the Idaho Board of 
Correction at some point on or before Abramowski turned 21.  (Sealed R., pp.204, 224.) 
Abramowski did well on probation.  (Conf. Docs., pp.755, 765.)  In March 2015, 
just before he turned 21, Abramowski filed a motion to terminate probation and dismiss 
the case or, alternatively, to be placed on unsupervised adult probation.  (Conf. Docs., 
pp.762-64; see also Sealed R., p.482.)  The district court granted the alternative request 
and converted Abramowski’s “supervised juvenile probation to unsupervised (Court) 
probation” for a period of four years.  (Sealed R., pp.478-81.)   
In March 2017, Abramowski moved to set aside his conviction and dismiss the 
case pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1)(b)(i).  (R., p.141.)  Finding after a hearing that 
Abramowski had no adjudicated probation violations and that there was “no longer cause 
for continuing the period of probation,” the district court granted the motion—i.e., it 
“terminate[d] the sentence, set aside the plea of guilty, dismiss[ed] the case, and finally 
discharge[d]” Abramowski.  (R., pp.143-45.) 
After the district court entered its order of dismissal, Abramowski filed a motion 
to seal the case pursuant to I.C.A.R. 32(i).  (R., p.146.)  At the outset of the hearing on the 
motion, the district court indicated it was inclined to enter an order sealing any records of 
what it deemed to be juvenile proceedings, including “the entirety of the court file from 
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the date of the order withholding judgment until the date that [the court] placed 
[Abramowski] on unsupervised probation.”  (3/29/17 Tr., p.1, L.14 – p.2, L.9.)  The court 
also indicated it would seal other records of a confidential nature, including the “various 
evaluations by medical and mental health professionals” that were contained in the court 
file.  (3/29/17 Tr., p.2, Ls.8-18.) 
When given the opportunity to argue the motion, Abramowski’s counsel agreed 
that the records the court identified should be sealed.  (3/29/17 Tr., p.3, Ls.19-22, p.6, 
Ls.1-4.)  She also informed the court that Abramowski and his mother wished to have the 
case “expunged.”  (3/29/17 Tr., p.3, L.23 – p.4, L.2.)  Counsel explained: 
They’re having difficulty, I think, with the fact that this 
information is public on a repository.  And to the extent that the Court has 
the authority to remove that from the repository, that would be a concern 
of theirs; that [Abramowski] has had, I think, trouble finding housing; he’s 
actually been denied housing because of these criminal charges; he’s also 
had difficulty finding employment, specifically because employers and 
housing folks are able to get on the Internet and search and find these 
charges, and that’s causing him economic harm. 
 
(3/29/17 Tr., p.4, Ls.3-12.) 
After hearing additional argument, the district court declined to entertain the 
request for “expungement,” noting the request was “different than what was in 
[Abramowski’s] motion, which simply asked [the court] to seal the entirety of the file.”  
(3/29/17 Tr., p.6, L.15 – p.7, L.19.)  The court invited counsel to file a motion that clearly 
set forth a request for “expungement” and indicated that, because it was “leav[ing] the 
bench,” any such motion would likely be addressed by a different judge.  (3/29/17 Tr., 
p.6, L.22 – p.7, L.19.)  The court did state, “[f]or the record,”  that “if [it] felt that [it] had 
legal authority to expunge, [the court] would exercise discretion in this case to grant that” 
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because, in the court’s opinion, “Mr. Abramowski [had] earned some additional 
consideration from the Court.”  (3/29/17 Tr., p.7, Ls.3-9.)  As to the motion to seal that 
was actually before it, the court granted the request, at least in part, and entered an order 
sealing all mental health and psychological evaluations/assessments, as well as all records 
of “[a]ll proceedings from the original sentencing date of June 21, 2010 until August 11, 
2015.”  (R., pp.149-51; see also 3/29/17 Tr., p.7, L.20 – p.9, L.6.) 
 On April 25, 2017, Abramowski filed a motion seeking “‘expungement’ of his 
criminal record under [I.C.A.R.] 32(i).”  (R., pp.154-55.)  As the basis for his motion, 
Abramowski relied on the district court’s earlier findings, made in conjunction with its 
order to seal, that Abramowski’s autism spectrum disorder diagnosis and related 
“limitations” had resulted in an “inability to secure employment and independent living 
opportunities” and constituted “extraordinary circumstances” justifying the sealing of 
Abramowski’s juvenile and mental health records.  (Compare R., pp.149-50 with R., 
p.155.)  “These findings,” Abramowski argued, were “also enough to warrant 
‘expungement’ of his criminal record” under Rule 32(i).  (R., p.155.) 
After Abramowski filed his motion for “expungement,” the case was reassigned to 
a different district court judge.  (R., pp.170, 172.)  The court held a hearing on the 
motion, at which Abramowski’s counsel presented argument but no evidence.  (R., p.171; 
6/15/17 Tr.)  As she had before, counsel represented that Abramowski was having 
difficulty finding employment and housing due to the fact that his criminal history is 
“available to the public and on the record.”  (6/15/17 Tr., p.10, L.21 – p.12, L.2.)  The 
state opposed the motion, pointing out there was no evidence that Abramowski had 
actually been financially harmed as a result of having the record of the dismissed arson 
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conviction available to the public, and arguing disclosure of that record was “in the public 
safety interest.”  (6/15/17 Tr., p.12, L.6 – p.13, L.3.)   
Following the hearing, the district court entered an order denying the motion for 
“expungement.”  (R., pp.172-74.)  The court recognized the prior judge’s finding that 
“Abramowski has been unable to secure employment and independent living 
opportunities” as a result of “limitations which relate to Abramowski’s autism spectrum 
disorder.”  (R., pp.172-73.)  The court also noted the prior judge had “entered an order in 
March 2017 sealing numerous court records relating to this case” and, thus, had already 
“granted some expungement relief.”  (R., pp.172-73.)   The court declined to “grant any 
relief in addition to that already granted by” the prior judge, reasoning:  “In a case such as 
this, involving a type of serious and potentially dangerous criminal act, the public interest 
predominates over the defendant’s privacy interest.”  (R., p.173.) 
 Abramowski subsequently filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the order 
denying his motion for “expungement.”  (R., pp.176-78.)  At a hearing on the motion, 
Abramowski  called two witnesses.  (R., pp.180-81; 7/19/17 Tr.)  The first witness, Neil 
Jarski, is a developmental therapist who, for the past six or so years, had worked with 
Abramowski and assisted him with his “daily living skills,” including filling out 
applications for employment and housing.  (7/19/17 Tr., p.7, L.8 – p.8, L.11.)  Mr. Jarski 
testified that, for the past six months, Abramowski had been employed as a cameraman at 
PBS.  (7/19/17 Tr., p.8, L.15 – p.9, L.5.)  According to Mr. Jarski, Abramowski had been 
working at PBS “for about an hour or two a week” but, “for the last six weeks, he hasn’t 
had to work at all.  They have had no time for him.”  (7/19/17 Tr., p.8, Ls.23-25.)  Mr. 
Jarski testified that Abramowski had attempted to find other employment and filled out 
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between 80 and 90 job applications, but only got two callbacks—one from a restaurant 
where Abramowski worked and was evaluated for a day before being let go, and the other 
from PBS where he was still employed as a cameraman.  (7/19/17 Tr., p.9, L.12 – p.12, 
L.13.) 
Mr. Jarski also testified regarding Abramowski’s efforts to finding housing.  
(7/19/17 Tr., p.12, L.14 – p.13, L.18.)  Mr. Jarski testified that Abramowski had applied 
for subsidized housing at four different apartment complexes, all of which had “a year to 
three-year wait.”  (7/19/17 Tr., p.12, Ls.18-25, p.13, Ls.11-16, p.16, L.25 – p.17, L.2.)  
One of the apartment complexes accepted Abramowski’s application but, after viewing 
the property, Abramowski decided for logistical reasons to not pursue that particular 
housing option.  (7/19/17 Tr., p.13, Ls.2-10, p.16, L.25 – p.17, L.5.) 
Mr. Jarski testified that the lack of response Abramowski received from potential 
employers and landlords was “very untypical” and that other individuals with whom Mr. 
Jarski had worked, including one or two who also had criminal records, albeit less 
significant, “[u]sually” got “some response.”  (7/19/17 Tr., p.14, L.15 – p.16, L.3.)  Mr. 
Jarski admitted, however, that of the 80 to 90 job applications and three unsuccessful 
housing applications Abramowski had submitted, Abramowski was never given any 
specific reason why his applications were “denied.”  (7/19/17 Tr., p.16, L.13 – p.17, 
L.20.)  Abramowski did get a letter from one of the apartment complexes that informed 
him his application was being rejected based either on “something listed from his 
landlords, there [sic] references, his credit, [or his] criminal history.”  (7/19/17 Tr., p.17, 
Ls.8-18 (punctuation and bracketed material added for ease of readability); see also 
 
 7 
Defense Exhibit A.)  But there was “nothing specific” in the letter informing Abramowski 
on which of those bases the rejection decision rested.  (7/19/17 Tr., p.17, Ls.8-20.) 
The second witness who testified at the hearing on Abramowski’s motion to 
reconsider was Abramowski’s mother, Diane Abramowski.  (7/19/17 Tr., p.19, Ls.11-15.)  
Mrs. Abramowski testified that she and her husband “have full legal guardianship and 
conservatorship” over Abramowski and “look after all of his finances.”  (7/19/17 Tr., 
p.19, L.19 – p.20, L.6.)  Mrs. Abramowski was familiar with Abramowski’s “financial 
situation” and knew that he had never had a “credit card or any sort of credit history.”  
(7/19/17 Tr., p.20, Ls.7-18.)  She testified that, since 2012, Abramowski had been 
“consistently” filling out job applications.  (7/19/17 Tr., p.20, L.24 – p.22, L.2.)  She also 
testified that, although Abramowski was employed, he was not making much money 
“because the hours just declined.”   (7/19/17 Tr., p.22, L.16 – p.23, L.9.)  
Regarding Abramowski’s living situation, Mrs. Abramowski testified that 
Abramowski had always lived with her but that she “want[ed] him to be able to live 
independently and have a life where he can get a job someday and be able to be self-
supportive, if that’s at all possible.”  (7/19/17 Tr., p.23, Ls.10-16.)  Mrs. Abramowski 
was not personally involved in helping Abramowski look for housing, but she was aware 
that he filled out several applications and that he received a letter denying one of his 
housing applications in August 2016.  (7/19/17 Tr., p.23, L.20 – p.24, L.22.)  The letter, 
previously referred to by Mr. Jarski, indicated Abramowski’s application was being 
declined “based on information obtained from previous landlords or references listed on 
[Abramowski’s] application for housing and/or credit bureau report or criminal history 
reports.”  (Defense Exhibit A; see also 7/19/17 Tr., p.16 – p.26, L.9, p.27, L.24 – p.28, 
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L.7.)  Mrs. Abramowski testified Abramowski had never had any previous landlords, that 
his references would have been people who worked at organizations at which he 
volunteered, and that, to her knowledge, he had no credit bureau report.  (7/19/17 Tr., 
p.25, L.1 – p.26, L.6.)  According to Mrs. Abramowski, “that [left] only the criminal 
history reports” as the basis for denying Abramowski’s housing application.  (7/19/17 Tr., 
p.26, Ls.7-9.) 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the hearing, Abramowski’s counsel 
argued it was “the defense’s position” that the only reason Abramowski’s employment 
and housing applications had been rejected was “because of his criminal record and his 
criminal history.”  (7/19/17 Tr., p.28, L.15 – p.29, L.4.)  Counsel therefore asked the 
district court to “further expunge [Abramowski’s] record, so that when he is putting in for 
housing and employment and folks go to search his background, this doesn’t come up and 
then immediately cause him to not be called back in or to get a job or to get housing.”  
(7/19/17 Tr., p.29, Ls.5-11.)  The state opposed the request for “further expunge[ment],” 
arguing the evidence showed that Abramowski was actually working, albeit in a limited 
capacity, and that there was no evidence showing Abramowski’s inability to obtain 
additional employment or housing was actually due to his criminal history.  (7/19/17 Tr., 
p.29, L.13 – p.30, L.18.)  The state also noted the seriousness of Abramowski’s offense, 
stating:  “He did light an occupied dwelling on fire.  In the police report, he indicated he 
did that with the intent to kill his family.”  (7/19/17 Tr., p.30, L.19 – p.31, L.1.)  
Considering the nature of the offense, the state argued that denial of the motion for 
further “expungement” was necessary “in the interest of keeping the community safe” and 
that prospective employers and landlords “need to know that [Abramowski] has at least 
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been charged with this” and need to be “aware of who they are going to be potentially 
employing or having live in their facilities.”  (7/19/17 Tr., p.31, Ls.2-10.) 
 Following the hearing, the district court entered an order denying Abramowski’s 
motion for reconsideration.  (R., pp.182-84.)  The court explained that, in denying 
Abramowski’s original motion for “expungement,” it had “balanc[ed] the public interest 
in knowing that the defendant previously had been charged with arson in the first degree 
with the defendant’s privacy interest.”  (R., pp.182-83.)  The court further explained that 
“a primary consideration” in its decision “was the undisputed fact that the defendant 
actually committed the acts constituting arson in the first degree, even though as a matter 
of law the charge ultimately was dismissed following successful completion of a period 
of probation.”  (R., p.183.)  After considering “the additional evidence and argument 
presented” to it and reviewing “the entire written record,” the court “still conclude[d] that 
the public interest outweighs the defendant’s privacy interest.”  (R., p.183.) 
 Abramowski filed a notice of appeal, timely from both the order denying his 





Abramowski states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Abramowski’s requests for expungement? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.10.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Abramowski failed to show the district court abused its discretion, either in denying 








Abramowski Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying 
His Requests For Expungement 
 
A. Introduction 
 The district court denied Abramowski’s motion for “expungement” and his 
subsequently filed motion for reconsideration, finding that the public interest in 
disclosure predominated over Abramowski’s privacy interest.  (See R., pp.173, 183.)  
Abramowski challenges the district court’s decisions, arguing with respect to both rulings 
that the court “did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards” and, therefore, 
abused its discretion.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-18.)  Abramowski’s arguments fail.  A 
review of the record and of the district court’s rulings shows it perceived the issue as one 
of discretion, exercised reason, and acted within the boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards governing Abramowski’s motions for expungement 
and for reconsideration.  Abramowski has failed to show any abuse of discretion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“Decisions of the district court to grant or deny relief under Idaho Court 
Administrative Rule (I.C.A.R.) 32 are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”  State v. 
Gurney, 152 Idaho 502, 503, 272 P.3d 474, 475 (2012) (citing State v. Turpen, 147 Idaho 
869, 872, 216 P.3d 627, 630 (2009)); accord State v. Allen, 156 Idaho 332, 336, 325 P.3d 
673, 677 (Ct. App. 2014); Doe v. State, 153 Idaho 685, 687, 290 P.3d 1277, 1279 (Ct. 
App. 2012).  The denial of a motion for reconsideration is also reviewed for an abuse of 




On review of a discretionary decision, the reviewing court will affirm if it appears 
from the record that the lower court “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason.”  Gurney, 152 Idaho at 503, 272 P.3d at 475 (citations 
and internal quotation marks and omitted). 
 
C. The District Court Acted Consistently With Applicable Legal Standards And 
Otherwise Correctly Exercised Its Discretion In Denying Abramowski’s Motion 
For “Expungement” 
 
The public has a First Amendment right to know what goes on in criminal courts.  
Allen, 156 Idaho at 336, 325 P.3d at 677 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980)).  The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment does 
not just protect expressing ideas and disseminating information, but receiving information 
and ideas.  See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 
408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)).  Indeed, “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the 
press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the 
stock of information from which members of the public may draw.”  Richmond 
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-76 (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).  Criminal proceedings are therefore presumptively open, and 
“[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be 
open to the public.”  Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-76, 581. 
Consistent with the public’s constitutional right to know what transpires in 
criminal proceedings, the Idaho Supreme Court, “pursuant to [its] authority to control 
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access to court records,” promulgated Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32.  I.C.A.R. 
32(a).  The rule “reflects the recognized policy that ‘the public has a right to examine and 
copy the judicial department’s declarations of law and public policy and to examine and 
copy the records of all proceedings open to the public.’”  Allen, 156 Idaho at 336, 325 
P.3d at 677 (quoting I.C.A.R. 32(a)).  However, “[s]triking a balance between the 
public’s constitutional right to access criminal records and the privacy rights of 
individuals,” the rule “exempts from disclosure highly private information such as 
presentence investigation reports, most unreturned warrants, documents that would 
identify jurors on a Grand Jury, and  jury questionnaires.”  Id.; see also I.C.A.R. 32(g). 
“In very narrow circumstances,” court records may be sealed on a case-by-case 
basis under Rule 32(i).  Allen, 156 Idaho at 336, 325 P.3d at 677.  The rule does not 
provide for or contemplate a literal “expungement” (i.e., destruction or obliteration) of 
court records.  State v. Turpen, 147 Idaho 869, 870, 216 P.3d 627, 628 (2009).  Thus, 
when a party requests “expungement” of records pursuant to I.C.A.R. 32(i), the Idaho 
Supreme Court interprets such request as one for “the issuance of a court order requiring 
physical or electronic sequestration of such records from public access or inspection.”  
Turpen, 147 Idaho at 870-71, 216 P.3d at 628-29.  District courts do not, however, have 
“unfettered discretion” to “expunge” or “seal case files” under this rule; “rather, a court is 
only allowed to seal portions of a case file if,” after a hearing, “it finds that the 
petitioner’s privacy interests predominate over the public’s constitutional right to know.”  
I.C.A.R. 32(i); Allen, 156 Idaho at 336, 325 P.3d at 677; Turpen, 147 Idaho at 871, 216 
P.3d at 629.  Even where the court does seal or “expunge” records “to protect 
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predominating privacy interests, it must fashion the least restrictive exemption from 
disclosure consistent with privacy interests.”  I.C.A.R. 32(i)(1). 
Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i)(2) lists a number of bases upon which a 
court considering a motion to seal or “expunge” may find the moving party has a 
legitimate privacy interest.  Relevant here, the court may grant a motion to seal or 
“expunge” if it makes the determination, in writing, that the records at issue “contain 
facts or statements, the dissemination or publication of which may compromise the 
financial security of, or could reasonably result in economic or financial loss or harm to a 
person having an interest in” the records.  I.C.A.R. 32(i)(2)(C).  A finding that disclosure 
of the records might reasonably result in economic or financial harm to the interested 
party does not, however, compel the entry of an order sealing or “expunging” those 
records.  A court considering the request for “expungement” must still “determine and 
make a finding of fact as to whether the interest in privacy or public disclosure 
predominates.”  I.C.A.R. 32(i)(1); see also Doe, 153 Idaho at 690, 290 P.3d at 1282 
(noting district court had “broad discretion to determine whether Doe’s claim of 
economic harm is so compelling as to outweigh the overarching public interest in 
disclosure); State v. Collins, 157 Idaho 857, 861-62, 340 P.3d 1173, 1177-78 (Ct. App. 
2014) (defendant’s assertion of financial loss, while weighing in favor of privacy interest, 
outweighed by facts favoring interest in public disclosure).  “Because the public interest 
in access to criminal court records is obviously weighty,” the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
“surmise[d] it would be an exceptional circumstance where a custodian judge would find 
that interest exceeded by a convicted person’s assertion of economic harm flowing from 
the conviction.”  Doe, 153 Idaho at 690, 290 P.3d 1282. 
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Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of this case shows the district 
court properly exercised its discretion in denying Abramowski’s motion for 
“expungement.”  Abramowski moved for “expungement” of his criminal record on the 
asserted basis that the availability of that record to the public was causing him financial 
harm.  (R., pp.154-68; 6/15/17 Tr., p.8, L.20 – p.12, L.2, p.13, Ls.5-9.)  At the hearing on 
the motion, Abramowski’s counsel represented Abramowski was having a difficult time 
obtaining employment and housing as a result of his criminal record being “available to 
the public.”  (6/15/17 Tr., p.10, L.21 – p.11, L.11.)  Counsel also relied on the previous 
district court judge’s finding that Abramowski’s limitations related to his autism 
spectrum disorder had resulted in Abramowski being unable to secure employment and 
independent living opportunities and constituted “extraordinary circumstances” justifying 
the sealing of Abramowski’s juvenile and mental health records.  (6/15/17 Tr., p.11, 
Ls.11-18; R., pp.149-50.)  However, neither Abramowski nor his counsel presented any 
evidence showing that Abramowski had actually been denied any employment or housing 
as a result of the public having access to the remaining unsealed records.  (See generally 
6/15/17 Tr.) 
In denying Abramowski’s motion, the district court specifically cited I.C.A.R. 
32(i) and Turpen, supra.  (R., pp.172-73.)  The court recognized the prior judge’s findings 
made in relation to its order to seal and also noted that, based upon those findings, 
Abramowski had already been granted “some expungement relief.”  (R., pp.172-73.)  The 
court clearly understood its decision whether to grant Abramowski’s motion for further 
“expungement” was discretionary but it declined to do so, finding that, “[i]n a case such 
as this, involving a type of serious and potentially dangerous criminal act, the public 
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interest predominates of the defendant’s privacy interest.”  (R., p.173.)  Because the 
record shows the court “determined the applicable rule of law, made findings consistent 
with that rule, and decided the motion by an exercise of reason,” Abramowski cannot 
show the district court abused its discretion.  Gurney, 152 Idaho at 504-05, 272 P.3d at 
476-77. 
Abramowski argues otherwise.  Specifically, he contends “the district court did 
not act consistently with the applicable legal standards,” apparently because it did not 
find, as a matter of law, that “Abramowski’s interest in privacy predominated over the 
interest in public disclosure, because the dissemination of the materials related to the case 
would reasonably result, and had already resulted, in economic or financial loss or harm 
to Mr. Abramowski; namely, his inability to secure employment and independent living 
opportunities.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-14.)  This argument fails to show an abuse of 
discretion for at least two reasons. 
First, as discussed above, Abramowski did not present any evidence in support of 
his motion for “expungement,” much less any evidence showing that “the dissemination 
of the materials related to the case would reasonably result, and had already resulted, in 
economic or financial loss or harm.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-14.)  Abramowski did cite 
the prior district court judge’s finding that Abramowski had been unable to secure 
employment and independent living opportunities as a result of limitations related to 
Abramowski’s autism spectrum disorder.  (6/15/17 Tr., p.11, Ls.11-18; R., pp.149-50.)  
However, nothing about that finding actually supported Abramowski’s claim that his 
inability to obtain employment and housing was a result of his criminal record being 
public, rather than a result of his autism-related “limitations.”  Because Abramowski 
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presented no evidence to support his assertion of financial loss resulting from the 
availability of his criminal record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding the public interest in disclosure predominated over Abramowski’s privacy 
interests. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, even accepting as true Abramowski’s 
assertions that his inability to secure employment and housing was a direct result of his 
criminal record being public, such did not compel a finding by the district court that 
“Abramowski’s interest in privacy predominated over the interest in public disclosure.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p.13.)  For purposes of deciding whether to grant a criminal 
defendant’s motion to “expunge” or seal a record pursuant to I.C.A.R. 32(i), the 
determination whether the defendant’s privacy interest or the public interest in disclosure 
predominates is a “factual determination.”  Turpen, 147 Idaho at 872, 216 P.3d at 630; 
see also I.C.A.R. 32(i)(1) (“the court shall determine and make a finding of fact as to 
whether the interest in privacy or public disclosure predominates”).  While a defendant’s 
financial loss resulting from public access to his or her criminal record is a legitimate 
privacy interest, that interest may nevertheless be outweighed by other facts that favor the 
interest in public disclosure.  See, e.g., Collins, 157 Idaho at 861-62, 340 P.3d at 1177-78 
(financial loss and dismissal of case weighed in favor of privacy interest, but that interest 
was outweighed by “significant fact” that defendant admitted to conduct forming the 
basis for his dismissed lewd conduct charge); Doe, 153 Idaho at 690, 290 P.3d at 1282 
(district court had “broad discretion to determine whether Doe’s claim of economic harm 
is so compelling as to outweigh the overarching public interest in disclosure”). 
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The district court in this case considered the facts that weighed in favor of 
Abramowski’s privacy interest, including Abramowski’s assertions of economic harm 
and the fact that the case had been dismissed.  (R., pp.172-73.)  However, the court also 
considered the “serious and potentially dangerous” nature of the crime and the 
“undisputed fact that [Abramowski] committed the acts constituting arson in the first 
degree.”  (R., pp.172-73, 183.)  Although Abramowski would have liked the court to have 
given his assertions of economic harm more weight, he has failed show that the court 
abused its discretion in weighing the competing interests and ultimately concluding the 
public interest in disclosure predominated.  See Collins, 157 Idaho at 861-62, 340 P.3d at 
1177-78 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding public interest in disclosure 
predominated over defendant’s privacy interest; although dismissal of case and 
defendant’s assertions of financial loss weighed in favor of privacy interest, fact that 
defendant admitted conduct underlying dismissed lewd conduct charge was “significant 
fact” weighing in favor of public’s interest in disclosure).  The district court’s order 
denying Abramowski’s motion for “expungement” should be affirmed. 
 
D. The District Court Acted Consistently With Applicable Legal Standards And 
Otherwise Correctly Exercised Its Discretion In Denying Abramowski’s Motion 
For Reconsideration 
 
After the district court denied his motion for “expungement,” Abramowski filed a 
motion for reconsideration.  (R., pp.176-78.)  The district court conducted a hearing on 
the motion, at which Abramowski “presented evidence of the difficulty he has had in 
obtaining independent housing and regular employment.”  (R., p.182; see generally 
7/19/17 Tr.)  After considering the additional evidence and reviewing “the entire written 
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record,” the district court entered an order denying Abramowski’s motion for 
reconsideration because it “still conclude[d] that the public interest outweighs the 
defendant’s privacy interest.”  (R., pp.182-84.)   
Abramowski challenges the court’s ruling, arguing as he did with respect to the 
ruling on his initial motion for “expungement” that the court “did not act consistently 
with the applicable legal standards.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.15.)  Specifically, he contends 
that, “[i]n light of the additional evidence presented in support of the motion for 
reconsideration, the district court should have found that Mr. Abramowski’s interest in 
privacy predominated over the interest in public disclosure, because the dissemination of 
the material related to the case had resulted in economic or financial loss or harm to Mr. 
Abramowski.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.15.)  Abramowski’s argument fails.  The additional 
evidence he cites did not actually demonstrate the economic harm Abramowski suffered 
was due to the availability of his criminal record to the public.  Even assuming it did, the 
district court was not required under the applicable legal standards to find that 
Abramowski’s privacy interest predominated over the public’s interest in having access to 
the criminal records.  
At the hearing on his motion for reconsideration, Abramowski presented evidence 
demonstrating, generally, that he was having difficulties obtaining meaningful 
employment and independent housing.  (7/19/17 Tr., p.7, L.6 – p.15, L.3, p.19, L.9 – 
p.26, L.13; Defense Exhibit A.)  Although the witnesses on his behalf speculated that 
Abramowski’s difficulties were due to the fact that his criminal record was available to 
the public, neither witness could definitively testify that Abramowski had been denied 
employment and housing due to his criminal record.  (7/19/17 Tr., p.14, L.15 – p.16, L.3, 
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p.16, L.13 – p.17, L.20, p.24, L.7 – p.25, L.9; see also Defense Exhibit A (letter denying 
housing application “based on information obtained from previous landlords or 
references listed on your application for housing and/or credit bureau report or criminal 
history reports” (emphases added)).)  In fact, the evidence actually showed that, despite 
the availability of his record on the public repository, Abramowski had secured a job as a 
cameraman (albeit with extremely sparse hours).  (7/19/17 Tr., p.8, L.16 – p.9, L.5, p.11, 
L.20 – p.12, L.13, p.22, L.16 – p.23, L.9.)  One of his applications for housing had also 
been accepted, but Abramowski ultimately chose to not pursue that housing option.  
(7/19/17 Tr., p.12, L.14 – p.13, L.16, p.16, L.25 – p.17, L.5.)  Because the additional 
evidence Abramowski presented in support of his motion for reconsideration did not 
actually support his claim that he had been denied meaningful employment and housing 
due to the availability of his criminal record, Abramowski cannot show the district court 
abused its discretion in concluding that the public interest in disclosure still predominated 
over Abramowski’s privacy interest. 
Even assuming the additional evidence showed Abramowski’s difficulties 
obtaining regular employment and housing were a direct result of the record of his 
criminal case being available on the public repository, Abramowski has still failed to 
demonstrate an abuse of discretion.  Once again, Abramowski appears to argue that, once 
he established the dissemination of his record resulted in economic harm, the district 
court was required to find, as a matter of law, that “Abramowski’s interest in privacy 
predominated over the interest in public disclosure.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.15, 17.)  This 
argument fails for the reasons already discussed in Section C of this brief (see Section C, 
pp.17-18), which the state incorporates by reference herein. 
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Although Abramowski characterizes the court’s ruling on his motion to reconsider 
as being inconsistent with applicable legal standards, he also appears to challenge the 
court’s reasoning.  Specifically, he argues that the court failed in its weighing process to 
adequately consider information in the record that suggests “Abramowski presents a low 
risk to the community,” a fact Abramowski asserts “reduc[es] the interest in public 
disclosure.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.17 (citing Conf. Docs., pp.779-80 (2015 psychological 
evaluation in which Dr. Sombke opined that “as long as Abramowski’s treatment and 
supports in the community remain in place,” he could be “considered a low risk to the 
public”)).)  As Abramowski acknowledges, however, in denying his motion for 
reconsideration, the district court specifically indicated it had “reviewed the entire written 
record of this case.”  (R., p.183.)  Having done so, and having received additional 
evidence and entertained the arguments of counsel, both at the hearing on the original 
motion for “expungement” and at the hearing on the motion to reconsider, there can be no 
question the court was aware of Abramowski’s assessed risk level.  That the court did not 
find this fact tipped the balance in favor of Abramowski’s privacy interest does not show 
an abuse of discretion.  While Abramowski’s rehabilitation successes are laudable and 
earned him an early probation termination and dismissal of the case, the fact remains that 
Abramowski actually set fire to his home with the stated intent of killing his parents.  
(See PSI, pp.21-22.)  This fact, considered by the district court, is significant and supports 
the court’s determination that the public interest in disclosure predominated over 




Abramowski has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying 
his motion to reconsider.  As it did in relation to the original motion for “expungement,” 
the court perceived its decision as discretionary, applied the correct legal standards, and 
exercised reason in concluding Abramowski’s privacy interest was outweighed by the 
interest in public disclosure.  The court’s order denying Abramowski’s motion to 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order 
denying Abramowski’s motion for “expungement” and the order denying Abramowski’s 
motion for reconsideration. 
 DATED this 11th day of  July, 2018. 
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